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THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS: LAW OR POLITICS?
Henry Paul Monaghan*
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I argued (and still
believe) that Judge Robert Bork possessed surpassing qualifications for an
appointment to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, I became persuaded that
my submission was incomplete. Additional argument was necessary to es-
tablish that my testimony, if accepted, imposed a constitutional duty on
senators to vote for confirmation. To my surprise, further reflection convinces
me that no such argument is possible.
From the beginning, presidential nominations to the Supreme
Court' have been embroiled in public controversy. President Wash-
ington's nomination in 1795 of John Rutledge to succeed Chief Justice
Jay was a harbinger of things to come. Judge Rutledge had been a
member of the constitutional convention, an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court between 1789 and 1791, chief justice of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for
four months under a recess appointment. Nonetheless, the Federalist-
dominated Senate rejected the nomination, largely because of Judge
Rutledge's public opposition to the Jay Treaty.2 During the following
century, the Senate rejected or tabled Supreme Court nominations for
virtually every conceivable reason, including the nominee's political
views, political opposition to the incumbent President, a desire to hold
the vacancy for the next President, senatorial courtesy, interest group
pressure, and on occasion even the nominee's failure to meet minimum
professional standards. 3 Indeed, in the first io5 years of American
constitutional history, almost one-fourth of the nominees (20 out of
8i) failed to win confirmation; 4 others were confirmed only after in-
tense controversy. However, during the past century, the Senate's
actual role in the appointment process has diminished. In the twen-
Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1 The Constitution provides:
The President ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
2 See I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 124-39 (1922).
The Federalists also expressed concern that Judge Rutledge's opposition to the treaty was
evidence of his deteriorating mental stability. See id. at 130-31.
3 See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 71-153 (2d ed. 1985) (summarizing the
history of Supreme Court appointments during the nineteenth century). For a recent study,
see Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics,
49 J. POL. 998 (1987).
4 See R. HARRMS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 303 (2d ed. 1958).
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tieth century, presidential ascendancy has so increased that public
controversy seldom has resulted in unfavorable Senate action.
The intense and highly publicized controversy accompanying the
Senate's rejection of Judge Robert Bork and the withdrawal of Judge
Douglas Ginsburg nine days later are occasions for taking stock. Do
these incidents portend important and lasting shifts in the existing
structure of the appointment process? Do they signify that the Senate
now can and should reclaim the early constitutional pattern by adopt-
ing a more aggressive role in the appointment of Supreme Court
judges?
In this commentary, I want to submit two claims - one norma-
tive, the other empirical - and to raise one question. The normative
claim is that the Senate's role in the appointment of Supreme Court
judges is properly viewed as largely "political" in the broadest sense
of the term: no significant affirmative constitutional compulsion exists
to confirm any presidential nominee. So viewed, the Senate can serve
as an important political check on the President's power to appoint.
Moreover, the political nature of the Senate's role, like that of the
President, helps ameliorate the "countermajoritarian difficulty": by
increasing the likelihood that Supreme Court judges will hold views
not too different from those of the people's representatives, the Senate
can reduce the tension between the institution of judicial review and
democratic government.5,
The empirical claim is that, at least for the foreseeable future, the
overriding political power of the modern Presidency will continue to
confine the Senate's actual role in the appointment process to its
current dimensions. The Senate is incapable of systematically assum-
ing any role greater than that of providing a check against the ap-
pointment of nominees perceived to be morally unworthy or too rad-
ical. In this respect, the unanimous confirmations of Judges Kennedy
and Scalia reveal far more than does the rejection of Judge Bork.
Finally, the question I wish to raise is suggested by the nomination
(not the withdrawal) of Judge Douglas Ginsburg. Should limits be
imposed on the tenure of persons appointed judges of the Supreme
Court?
I.
We take for granted that the President will nominate a person
whose general constitutional philosophy the President endorses.
"There is," as Chief Justice Rehnquist recently stated, "no reason why
5 See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962) (describing this counter-
majoritarian difficulty).
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a President should not do this." 6 For the President, the confirmation
process itself is entirely political in the ordinary sense of the term.
He has selected an appointee satisfactory to him - a judgment that
may include the nominee's philosophy, as well as a wide range of
factors not associated with merit in a narrow sense, such as the
appointee's contribution to the diversity of the Court. The President
then seeks the Senate's consent, not its advice, and usually he can
count on ordinary politics to obtain that consent. But nothing in the
language of the appointments clause, in its origins, or in the actual
history of the appointment process supports a constitutionally based
presidential "right" to mold an independent branch of government for
a period extending long beyond his electoral mandate. Rather (and
to my surprise), all the relevant historical and textual sources support
the Senate's power when and if it sees fit to assert its vision of the
public good against that of the President.
At the time of the constitutional convention, the American gov-
ernmental structure reflected pronounced popular distrust of executive
power. The power of governors to appoint was everywhere sharply
restricted 7 and, not surprisingly, several delegates to the constitutional
convention (including John Rutledge) urged a restricted presidential
appointment power.8 Although the Virginia plan contemplated that
appointments to all national offices would be made entirely by the
legislature, the desirability of a significant presidential role gained
early recognition, and presidential authority to appoint all officers "not
otherwise provided for" was quickly and firmly established. 9 How-
ever, the appointment of federal judges remained controversial
throughout the entire convention. On Madison's motion, the power
to appoint Supreme Court judges was vested in the Senate, where it
remained until nearly the end of the convention. 10 After certain del-
egates objected that the Senate was too large to discharge this function
effectively, the existing constitutional provisions finally emerged as a
compromise. 1
6 W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 235 (I987).
7 "No state constitution granted to the governor an independent appointing power. In several
states the governor had little or no appointing power; in those states in which he exercised a
limited appointing power, it was always with the advice and consent either of a council appointed
by the legislature, or by the legislature itself. Only in Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hamp-
shire, and Pennsylvania were judges appointed by the governor, and in three of these states he
shared the appointing power with a council." R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at i9 (footnotes omitted).
8 C. WARREN, THE MAIING OF THE CONSTITUTION 177-79, 327-28, 639-43 (4937), contains
a lucid summary of the convention proceedings with respect to the appointment of judges. For
an account of the more general debate at the convention about the appointment process, see R.
HARRIS, cited above in note 4, at 17-25.
9 I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 2787, at 67 (M. Farrand rev. ed.
1966).
1o See id. at 232-33.
11 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 498-99 (M. Farrand
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The Constitution is silent on what criteria the Senate should use
in giving "Advice and Consent," but the goal of the provision was
clearly to help secure meritorious appointees. In this endeavor, both
the constitutional text and its historical origins indicate that "Advice"
was intended to be more than a redundant synonym for "Consent.' 12
President Washington actually sought and received advice on appoint-
ments, as he did on foreign affairs and treaties. 13 However, the
Constitution failed to provide any regular institutional mechanism for
securing meaningful Senate "Advice" - as distinguished from the
Senate's "Consent," which could be rendered simply with a vote. This
omission allowed the authors of The Federalist to accept the goal of
meritorious appointments, but to discount the Senate's affirmative role
in that regard. The Federalist assumed that the power to appoint
was an inherently executive function and insisted that the President's
power to nominate was virtually equivalent to the power to appoint. 14
The constitutional scheme described in The Federalist limited the
Senate to the role of "an excellent check" against presidential corrup-
tion and incompetence. 15 Envisioning the Senate's role thus con-
strained, The Federalist opined that "[i]t is ... not very probable that
[the President's] nomination would often be overruled.' u 6 Interest-
ingly, Federalist No. 78 assumes that the mode of appointing Supreme
Court judges raises no issue distinct from that of "appointing officers
of the union in general.' 7
rev. ed. x966) (Report of the Committee of Eleven). The committee proposal was adopted on
September 7, 1787. See id. at 539.
12 See Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE
L.J. 657, 659 (1970) (arguing that simply as a matter of ordinary language the inclusion of
"Advice" in the text of the Constitution means that the Senate must do more than merely
consent); see also R. HARRIS, DECISION 94-96 (1971) (describing the impact upon the Carswell
confirmation proceedings of Charles Black's argument that the constitutional text alone estab-
lishes an active role for the Senate). For a discussion of state practice, see note 7 above.
13 See Silbey, "Our Successors Will Have an Easier Task": The First Congress Under the
Constitution, z787-1791, in THIS CONSTITUTION No. 17, Winter x987, at 4, 7.
14 See THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 512 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("There can in
this view be no difference between nominating and appointing.").
Is Federalist No. 66 emphasized that the Constitution vests the power of choice in the
President, not the Senate. See id. No. 66, at 449 (A. Hamilton). Federalist No. 76 and No.
77 addressed the appointment process in detail, and argued that presidential nominations would
secure good and stable public administration. As for requiring Senate confirmation, "[i]t would
be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to
preventing the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection,
from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity." Id. No. 76, at 513 (A. Hamilton).
16 Id. No. 76, at 512 (A. Hamilton).
17 Id. No. 78, at 522 (A. Hamilton). This premise is particularly curious because it does
not reflect the procedures employed at the time in the existing state governments, or the special
attention that the convention gave judicial appointments, both generally and in textual provisions
concerning Supreme Court judges specifically. Even more importantly, it ignores the fact that
Supreme Court judges head an independent branch of the government and are expected to hold
1988] 1205
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Nonetheless, once the new government began to operate, the actual
process of appointment took on a shape different from that envisaged
by either the Framers or the authors of The Federalist. Patronage
became important, and the senators quickly established a powerful
role in the nomination of federal officials who functioned within their
states. 18 More importantly, Supreme Court nominations moved along
their own track, one in which the Senate viewed the nominee's judicial
ideology - to say nothing of overtly partisan political considerations
- as relevant. The latter development was perhaps inevitable. Con-
cepts such as "merit" and "the public interest" might have seemed
relatively uncontroversial to the Framers, but they became far more
problematic as social divisions first generated and then legitimated
political parties. 19 The line between notions like public interest and
merit on the one hand and simple party advantage on the other
blurred in practice, partly because it was unclear in principle.
The relevant constitutional law is minimal, and largely negative
in character. In theory, the President alone can nominate; beyond
that, both the President and the Senate share a common responsibility
for the appointment of morally and professionally fit persons to the
Court. The Senate has the duty to reject any nominee whose appoint-
ment it believes will not advance the public good as the Senate
understands it. But the polycentric nature of the common good and
the actual history of the appointments clause persuades me to go one
step further: generally stated, no affirmative constitutional compulsion
to confirm exists. 20
office long after the President who nominates them. Such an oversight, if it be one, is at least
understandable. The analogy between Supreme Court appointments and other administration
appointments was more plausible because The Federalist assumed that the officials confirmed
by the Senate could not be removed without its consent. See id. No. 77, at 515 (A. Hamilton).
Moreover, the older idea that adjudication was simply part of the execution of law was perhaps
not yet completely dead. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, at 159-61 (1969); Powell, How Does the Constitution Structure Government?, in A
WORKABLE GOVERNMENT? 13, 27 (B. Marshall ed. 1987). Finally, The Federalist simply did
not envisage that the Supreme Court would become as powerful and contentious as it has.
Is See R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 40-41, 44, 50-5I (describing the emergence of "senatorial
courtesy" for local appointments); see also C.G. MACKENZIE, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTMENTS 215-32 (1981) (discussing the impact of congressional pressure on appointments
in more recent years); L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 28-59 (1985).
19 See generally R. KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY (1984) (describing the emergence
and legitimation of the party system). The gradual development of a partisan, nationwide, two-
party system between 1789 and 1844 profoundly affected the dynamics and procedure of electing
even the President. See generally R. McCoRMICK, THE PRESIDENTIAL GAME (1982).
20 No doubt the Senate could not rightly refuse confirmation on the basis of a constitutionally
impermissible criterion, such as racial prejudice. That aside, the only other plausible source for
an affirmative constitutional compulsion is structural: the Senate may not act so as materially
to impair the functioning of the Court. I am unsure of where this potential limitation leads,
however. I am clear that appointments can properly be made with an explicit design to reverse
12o6 [VOL. 101:1202
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The entire appointment process is best understood as largely be-
yond the operation of norms of legal right or wrong; instead it involves
mainly questions of prudence, judgment, and politics. 21 We are better
off recognizing a virtually unlimited political license in the Senate not
to confirm nominees. Most current assessments of the Senate's role
reject this, either explicitly or implicitly. For example, many insist
that Presidents have a "right" to appoint any "qualified" nominee. 22
Moreover, in both the Bork and Kennedy confirmation hearings, the
senators rejected any open-ended view of their authority. They
seemed to assume that they were under a duty to confirm unless Judge
Bork fell outside the mainstream of legal thinking. 23 If I am right,
however, that the Senate's role in the appointment process should be
political in nature, then a nominee may be rejected on the basis of
statesmanship, prudence, common sense, and politics, rather than
constitutional right and duty. Therefore, a nominee may be rejected
without the Senate having to establish humiliating propositions, such
as that the nominee is a dangerous radical. More generally, a political
view of the appointment process of Supreme Court judges "affords
the Senate an opportunity to carry on in another context its persistent
struggle with the executive branch to shape the contours of public
policy."24 In addition, the entire appointment process - nomination
and confirmation - can be seen as an additional way to moderate
established constitutional doctrine, as Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first appointments did. See
Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, ioI HARV. L. REv. 1164, 1166 (i988). Although this
process arguably "delegitimates" the Supreme Court, I cannot believe that such appointments
are improper.
21 The reason for treating this process as wholly political is only partly rooted in the inability
to formulate standards. The political conception permits me to avoid squarely facing the
question whether the confirmation process permits a senator properly to examine only his own
self-interest - refusing to confirm only out of fear of voter retaliation - or whether he also
must invoke some idea of the common good. This is not the occasion to explore whether simply
reflecting one's constituency discharges the representative's duty, or what role self-interest
properly may play in his vote. But politicians face many issues at once, and I am unsympathetic
with the position that they are obliged to view all of them as matters of principle all the time.
I can well imagine a conscientious senator believing that he should not sacrifice a public career
simply because the President has submitted a qualified but controversial nominee.
To be sure, a prolonged impasse over confirmation eventually could threaten the constitu-
tional requirement that there be a Supreme Court. Moreover, it is possible that a refusal to
confirm in order to retain the vacancy for the next President might be viewed as a threat to
judicial independence. However, any such cases are likely to be marginal and fact-dependent.
Whatever dangers they present in theory do not seem to provide the basis for a working rule
that legally or politically limits the Senate's role.
22 Cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. I4, 1987, at A22, col. i (editorial) (referring on the first day of the
hearings on Judge Kennedy to "the President's right, within reasonable limits, to propose Justices
of comparable philosophy").
23 This view persisted during the confirmation hearings on Judge Kennedy. See N.Y. Times,
Feb. 4, 1988, at AI8, col. I.
24 C.G. MACKENZIE, supra note I8, at 95.
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the countermajoritarian difficulty. Chief Justice Rehnquist recently
wrote: "When a vacancy occurs on the Court, it is entirely appropriate
that that vacancy be filled by the President, responsible to a national
constituency, as advised by the Senate, whose members are responsible
to regional constituencies. Thus, public opinion has some say in who
shall become judges of the Supreme Court. '25 I would add only that
when the Senate musters enough votes to reject a nomination, its
"regional" constituencies are likely to be the equivalent of a "national"
constituency. 26
II.
The Senate's actual role in the confirmation process depended upon
the shifting balance of political power between Congress and the
President. The Senate's significant nineteenth-century role reflected
the general congressional dominance of that era. Scarcely one hundred
years ago, Woodrow Wilson argued that national government was
congressional government - more precisely, "government by the
chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress." 2 7 Wilson put
aside the President with the dismissive observation that his "business
... occasionally great, is usually not much above routine. '28  Al-
though some such model of congressional government could be de-
fended as late as the beginning of the New Deal, modern government
25 W. REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 236.
26 Explicit recognition of the absence of any legal constraints on the confirmation process
accords with political reality. Certain academic critics overlook this and seem to suggest that
it is possible to articulate a Senate role bounded in some meaningful way. This position is
inherent in the claim that the Senate should be guided by "the Court's overall balance and
equilibrium." L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT xo6-1I (1985); see id. at 132-37.
Although the Senate might be able to implement this standard on a rough basis on rare occasions,
it cannot - and ought not - apply it on a sustained and systematic basis.
Taken seriously, Professor Tribe's position implies that the nominee's views on various
constitutional issues must be compared with those held by each of the eight current members,
and then assessed against the likely frequency that any given issues would in fact arise before
the Supreme Court. Even more importantly, because there are no apparent criteria for deter-
mining what constitutes a proper "balance," efforts to overcome the uncertain nature of the
inquiry simply would spawn attempts to define the boundaries of "proper" constitutional dis-
agreement.
Moreover, this conception of the confirmation process cannot be reconciled easily with core
principles of separation of powers. The judicial task is "to say what the law is," not to reflect
some Senate-prescribed equilibrium. For the Senate invariably to focus on some supposedly
ideal balance may in the long run compromise judicial independence, ultimately converting the
Court into a purely political organ.
27 See W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 82 (ig8I).
28 Id. at 170.
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is presidential government, at least in its most important aspects. 29
Presidential ascendancy in the appointment process reflects this fact.
The modern Presidency, even a lame-duck Presidency facing a
Senate controlled by the opposite party, has enormous resources for
mobilizing support and for disciplining those senators who refuse to
go along. Such resources - party discipline, ideology, and various
carrots and sticks - can be concentrated on any issue of significant
importance to the President. One could speculate extensively about
why those resources failed in the case of Judge Bork. For us it suffices
that the Bork proceedings themselves arose in a special context, one
in which the administration's hard-line attitude on judicial nomina-
tions had left a bitter residue. Many parties were spoiling for a fight,
and Judge Bork, who was perceived as far outside the mainstream of
legal thinking, 30 was the perfect catalyst to provoke one. Such a
configuration is unlikely to be repeated frequently, suggesting Judge
Bork's rejection portends no important institutional changes in the
President's ability to win confirmation of nominees.
The institutionally important point is that it takes enormous energy
for senators to unite in order to resist the President.3 ' Once under-
taken, such conduct cannot easily be sustained, as evidenced by the
relief with which the Senate greeted Judge Kennedy's nomination.
The senators made every effort to see him as different from Judge
Bork, regardless of whether he actually was. Commenting on Judge
Kennedy's "smooth sailing" on his initial Senate visit, Senator John
McCain, a conservative Republican from Arizona, put the point well:
the Senate was simply "weary" of fighting. "Nobody wants to go
through that again. There's just too much blood on the floor."3 2 At
most, Judge Bork's hearings may have established a tradition of more
probing Senate interrogation of a nominee, but the political back-
ground in which the entire confirmation process functions remains one
with a powerful Presidency. To be sure, the rejection reminds us that
29 The displacement of congressional government by presidential government and its impli-
cations for constitutional theory are considered in Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 1988).
30 See, e.g., Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. Rxv. 101, 'o (1987) (describing
Judge Bork as a "constitutional radical" whose "views do not lie within the scope of the
longstanding debate between liberals and conservatives" about the proper role of the Supreme
Court); Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist, 9 CARaozo L.
REv. 127, 130-34 (1987) (criticizing Judge Bork's views on minority and individual rights).
31 It is no accident that in his book on the Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist barely
mentions the Senate's role in the chapter on the appointment process. See W. REHNQUIST,
supra note 6, at 235-5I. On this issue, at least, The Federalist correctly predicted our present:
the Senate's role is marginal, and "[iut is not very probable that [the President's] nomination
would often be overruled." THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 512 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. i96I).
32 Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1987, at A3, col. 4. The article added that "Democrats also appeared
reluctant to engage in another battle, although they continued to insist that Kennedy would be
subject to intense scrutiny."
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periodically the American people seem to need a battle over a Supreme
Court appointment. But symbolism aside, the hard fact is that the
President's vision of what is proper judicial philosophy ultimately will
prevail, as Judge Kennedy's confirmation demonstrates.
Nonetheless, some believe that Judge Bork's rejection shows that
the Senate's role is less marginal than I have argued. The Senate's
failure to confirm Judge Bork is said to reflect popular rejection of
original understanding theory and popular acceptance of a general
constitutional right to privacy. Although these contentions initially
appear plausible, when carefully analyzed their flaws become appar-
ent. In fact, Judge Bork did not avow original understanding as the
sole basis for legitimate judicial decisionmaking. 33 Moreover, the
abortion cases, the most frequently cited illustration of Judge Bork's
rejection of a constitutional right to privacy, actually involve auton-
omy or freedom from regulation, not privacy. 34 Furthermore, the
claim that, at least in exceptional circumstances, the Senate acts as a
court of popular opinion endorsing or rejecting certain constitutional
views is unpersuasive. 35 Confirmation proceedings cannot be con-
strued as referenda of any sort on judicial philosophies - except
perhaps at the far margins - because the Senate is simply not
equipped to proffer or register constitutional judgments of such mag-
nitude.36 This is particularly true when, as in the case of Judge Bork,
commentators seek to extract such judgments from a bitter, wide-
ranging, and complex nomination proceeding that focused upon a
multitude of issues involving the Reagan Presidency and a number of
Supreme Court decisions.
33 See, e.g., Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, iooth Cong., ist Sess. 84-85 (1987) (testimony of Judge Bork) (pointing to
the commerce clause and legal tender cases as examples of nonoriginalist constitutional inter-
pretation that deserve to be respected as precedent); see also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) (arguing that the Framers "had no coherent
theory of free speech" and concluding that we thus "cannot solve our [free speech] problems
simply by reference to the text or to its history").
34 See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1424-27 (1974).
35 Those who would argue otherwise must explain why Judge Bork's rejection implicitly
endorses a liberal judicial philosophy, whereas the Senate's rejection of Justice Fortas as Chief
Justice did not repudiate the same philosophy. Not surprisingly, claims of this nature tend to
reflect the ideological commitments of their advocates. Compare Dworkin, From Bork to Ken-
nedy, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Dec. I7, 1987, at 36, 38 passim (stating that liberals contend that
Judge Bork's rejection was a declaration of popular will) with H. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at
43-45 (arguing that the rejection of Justice Fortas' nomination as Chief Justice reflected a
referendum on the Warren Court).
36 Cf. Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GEORGIA L. REv. 57, 82-83, 98-ioi (1987) (arguing that Congress is not institu-
tionally equipped to serve as a disinterested constitutional decisionmaker). In any event, the
Senate's views would not be binding on members of the Supreme Court. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
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III.
The events surrounding President Reagan's efforts to fill the va-
cancy left by Justice Powell's retirement raise an additional question.
When nominated, Judge Ginsburg was 41 years old. His relative
youth cannot by itself be treated as a disqualification. 37 Benjamin
Curtis was 41 when nominated, and Judge Story only 32. Because
confirmation effectively carries life tenure, Judge Ginsburg might well
have served for four decades. The nomination for such a potentially
lengthy period of service provides a singular occasion for reexamining
the advisability of life tenure for Supreme Court judges. For some,
the same premises that justify the free play of politics in the confir-
mation process might also weigh against life tenure. Also some limits
on judicial tenure would help reconcile judicial review with demo-
cratic government. My concerns lie elsewhere, however.
The most common defenses of life tenure, contained in Hamilton's
writing in The Federalist, are not fully persuasive. In Federalist No.
78, Hamilton argued that life tenure is indispensable to insulate the
judiciary from the other branches of government, and thus to ensure
its independence. 38  But even assuming that such complete judicial
independence is desirable, eliminating life tenure need not materially
undermine it.39 Presumably, what relieves judges of the incentive to
please is not the prospect of indefinite service, but the awareness that
their continuation in office does not depend on securing the continuing
approval of the political branches. Independence, therefore, could be
achieved by mandating fixed, nonrenewable terms of service. 40 Ham-
ilton's objection in Federalist No. 79 to a state constitutional provi-
sion imposing mandatory retirement on judges at sixty is similarly
unpersuasive. He stated that such a provision was unsound in "a
republic, where fortunes are not affluent, and pensions not expedi-
ent. ' 41 Given the current prevalence of pensions, however, Hamilton's
argument no longer carries weight.
I propose the consideration of two kinds of limitations on judicial
tenure. The first is an age limit. I think it quite astounding that a
37 Walter Dellinger suggests that youth might be a handicap. He observes that for some
young appointees, the problem is not that they lack sufficient experience, but that they will
cease to grow further because of the constant special treatment that Supreme Court judges
receive.
39 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-30 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. ig6i).
39 See Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed,
Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 816-
21 (arguing that a constitutional amendment limiting the term of Supreme Court judges to I8
years would have only very modest effect on judicial independence).
40 Anyone who suspects that a fixed term would not allow sufficient time for judges to
develop and display independence need only recall how quickly Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun defied the expectations of their respective appointers.
41 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 533 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. ig6i).
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majority of Supreme Court judges bordered on eighty years of age
before Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell retired. The Court's
workload is very heavy, and it is doubtful that many octogenarians
would be able to devote the energy necessary to the task. As Aristotle
said, "that judges of important causes should hold office for life is a
disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body."42 The
graying of the Court can only work to ensure even greater delegation
of responsibility to law clerks.
My second suggestion is premised on a distrust of relatively un-
accountable powerholders. The suggestion is that no one be permitted
to serve for more than some fixed and unrenewable term, such as
fifteen or twenty years. Governor Winthrop once described judges as
"gods upon earth," and that surely is true of the Supreme Court
judges. 43 It seems dubious policy to leave such power in any person's
hands for too long. In light of these concerns, and of the defects in
the original justifications for life tenure, the burden should be on those
who favor the continuation of the present arrangement to come forth
with their argument. Or is the short response to both of my sugges-
tions, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it"?
42 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. II, ch. 9 (B. Jowett trans. 1943).
43 Outside the context of high-visibility constitutional decisions, the important restraints on
the Supreme Court in its ordinary operations ultimately are not those imposed by the political
process, but the norms that the judges internalize before they reach the Supreme Court.
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